CACD Federal MTD — § 1983 and Monell

Section 1983 "excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrong." Heineke v. Santa Clara University, 965 F.3d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 2020). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion against a private defendant, the plaintiff must plausibly allege the challenged conduct is "fairly attributable" to the State. Belgau v. Inslee, 975 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2020).

The Rawson four-test framework

The Ninth Circuit identifies four tests for state action; satisfaction of any one suffices. Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc., 975 F.3d 742, 747 (9th Cir. 2020):

1. Public function. The private defendant performed a function "traditionally and exclusively governmental." Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2003); Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S. 802 (2019). Education and similar contracted services are typically not exclusively governmental. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Caviness v. Horizon Community Learning Center, 590 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 2010).

2. Joint action. A "sufficiently close nexus" between the state and the challenged conduct, or willful joint participation between state and private actor. O'Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2023); Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 2002). Government tracking, regulating, or contracting with a private entity does not by itself establish joint action.

3. Governmental compulsion or coercion. The state "has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Compulsion must come from defendant's State partner, not from third-party legal obligations.

4. Governmental nexus. The conduct is so connected with the state that the state must be deemed responsible for it. A residual category capturing relationships not fitting the prior three tests.

Federal criminal statutes generally do not create private causes of action

A related framework rule: federal criminal statutes (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 conspiracy) generally do not supply a private right of action. Henry v. Universal Tech. Inst., 559 F. App'x 648 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs sometimes attempt to recharacterize these as § 1985 claims in opposition; the Schneider rule blocks that.

How CACD applies it (corpus examples)

• 448047986 (Hernandez-Silva v. Instructure — Blumenfeld): edtech contractor (Canvas LMS); plaintiffs alleged Instructure tracked students under compulsory-attendance laws; granted without leave to amend on § 1983 (concession at hearing); three tests articulated; Pasadena Republican Club, Caviness, Rendell-Baker controlled.
• 438333724 (Taft v. Barresi — Magistrate Bristow): pro se Hollywood-fixer conspiracy theory; granted with leave (pro se posture); four-test Rawson articulation; private investigators and entertainment intermediaries are not state actors.

If you're the moving party

• Identify your client's actual relationship with any government entity. Contracts and regulation, standing alone, do not create state action.
• Walk each of the four Rawson tests and identify the specific factual void. Plaintiff carries the burden under all four.
• For "compulsory attendance" or similar third-party-statute theories, frame the alleged compulsion as running from the statute to a third party (school, agency), not from state to your client.
• Cite Henry to dispatch any § 371 / federal-criminal-statute private-right claims.

If you're the opposing party

• Pick the strongest Rawson test for your facts and develop it specifically. Joint action requires concrete coordination, not parallel conduct.
• For public-function theory, identify a function that is both "traditional" AND "exclusive" to government — contracting alone is insufficient.
• For governmental compulsion, plead specific state action (statute, regulation, directive) coercing your defendant's specific conduct.
• If federal-criminal-statute claims are at risk, recharacterize early under § 1983 or § 1985 in the operative complaint, not in opposition (Schneider).

A municipality is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only when execution of an official policy or custom inflicts the constitutional injury. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). At the pleading stage, a Monell claim must identify a specific policy, custom, or practice of constitutional violation — generic allegations of pattern do not suffice.

What Monell requires at the pleading stage

A plaintiff alleging municipal liability must plead one of three theories:

1. Express policy. A formal policy promulgated by a final policymaker.
2. Longstanding custom or practice. A pattern of similar prior incidents constituting a de facto policy.
3. Failure to train, supervise, or discipline. "Deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact." Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

For pattern-or-practice claims, the complaint must do more than recite "the existence of a custom." It must describe specific prior instances giving rise to a plausible inference of municipal acquiescence.

The CACD specificity arc

The corpus shows a clear arc from insufficient to sufficient pattern-pleading. Wright v. County of San Bernardino is the canonical example: the FAC was dismissed (417694715) but the SAC survived (427154493). What changed was the level of factual specificity — not the number of incidents.

• What lost (FAC): A bare reference to prior cases without narrative description, even if the count was sufficient.
• What won (SAC): Eight prior cases over ten years described with narrative facts — what happened, what the alleged constitutional violation was, how the County responded.

Settlements alone are not dispositive of a pattern. Stanislaus County v. Carter; Osuna v. County of Los Angeles. But settlements paired with narrative descriptions of underlying conduct can constitute the pattern showing.

Failure-to-train doctrine

Failure-to-train claims under Bryan County require deliberate indifference, which typically requires either (a) a pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees putting the municipality on notice, or (b) the rare "single-incident" case where the unconstitutional consequences are "so patently obvious that a city could be liable . . . without proof of a pre-existing pattern." Bryan County, 520 U.S. at 409.

Most CACD failure-to-train claims fall into category (a) and require pattern-pleading specificity.

Final-policymaker theory

Where plaintiff cannot show a pattern, an alternative is showing that the alleged constitutional violation was committed by a person with "final policymaking authority" under state law. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). This is fact-intensive and depends on the specific official's authority under California law.

If you're the moving party (defendant municipality)

• For pattern claims, demand specificity. Quote each alleged prior incident referenced in the complaint and identify whether it has narrative facts. Generic counts ("50 prior cases") without descriptions fail.
• For failure-to-train, require pleading of the specific inadequacy in training, the prior incidents that put the municipality on notice, and the deliberate-indifference link.
• For final-policymaker theory, challenge the authority of the named officer under state law.
• Where plaintiff has previously amended without curing specificity, cite the Wright v. SB County dyad and Sisseton-Wahpeton particularly-broad-discretion.

If you're the opposing party (plaintiff)

• Plead specific prior incidents with narrative description — what happened, the constitutional violation alleged, the agency response. Do not rely on counts alone.
• For failure-to-train, plead the specific training deficiency and the prior incidents that put the municipality on notice.
• For final-policymaker, identify the specific officer and cite the state-law provision granting policymaking authority.
• Where a first dismissal identifies specificity gaps, treat the order's deficiency-identification as a strict checklist for the amended complaint.