CACD Federal MTD — Procedure

Local Rule 7-3 requires the moving party to confer with opposing counsel at least seven days before filing a motion. The rule operates as a CACD-distinctive procedural threshold, but in practice the court applies a substance-over-form "purposes test" rather than a strict-compliance rule.

The rule

L.R. 7-3 requires counsel for the moving party to "confer in person, by telephone, or by video," "at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion," with counsel for the responding party "to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution." If the parties "are unable to reach a resolution which eliminates the necessity for a hearing," the moving party may file the motion.

The purposes test

Non-strict-compliance with L.R. 7-3 is not a winning preliminary objection where the parties have substantively conferred. Vargas v. Lockheed Martin (456067927) is the canonical example. Plaintiff argued Boeing's MTD should be denied for L.R. 7-3 noncompliance. The court overruled the objection because the parties had conducted a telephonic conference and detailed email exchanges addressing the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaints. "[T]he parties understood their respective positions, another formal meeting would have served little function, and Boeing fulfilled the purposes of Local Rule 7-3."

The operative test is whether the conferral served the rule's purpose: did the parties exchange enough detail to understand each other's positions, and did they consider potential resolution? When the answer is yes, formal noncompliance does not derail the motion.

What counts as substantive conferral

• A pre-filing telephonic or video conference of substantial duration discussing the merits.
• Detailed email exchanges that address the moving party's specific challenges to the complaint.
• Documentation showing the responding party understood the moving party's position.

A single perfunctory phone call or a one-line email referencing the coming motion may not suffice. The conferral must be "thorough" in the sense the rule requires.

L.R. 11-6.2 word-count compliance

A related preliminary objection involves L.R. 11-6.2 word-count compliance. The rule requires a certificate of compliance on motions exceeding designated word limits. CACD courts will dismiss this as a preliminary objection if defendant has included an appropriate certificate. Plaintiffs in Vargas tried this objection alongside L.R. 7-3; the court overruled it because Boeing's certificate of compliance was on the final page of the motion.

If you're the moving party

• Document the conferral. Keep emails and records of telephone calls.
• Where conferral is by telephone, follow up with email summarizing positions discussed. This creates a record.
• Address subsequent amendments through additional conferral. Where defendant intends to file successive MTDs (e.g., on FAC then SAC), conduct fresh conferrals on each.
• Include the L.R. 11-6.2 word-count certificate on the final page of every motion.

If you're the opposing party

• L.R. 7-3 noncompliance is rarely a winning preliminary objection where any substantive conferral occurred. Reserve it for cases where conferral was genuinely absent or pro forma.
• Where you raise the objection, plead specifically what the moving party did not do. Generic allegations of noncompliance lose.
• Focus your strongest arguments on the merits, not on procedural defaults that the court will likely overrule.

Most CACD federal motions to dismiss are decided without oral argument. Under Local Rule 7-15 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), the court has authority to determine that a motion is "appropriate for decision without oral argument."

The standard footnote

The disposition appears as a standard footnote in the order, typically at the introduction:

Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

This footnote (or a close variant) appears in essentially every Wright II MTD ruling and in many other CACD judges' rulings.

Practical consequences for litigants

The absence of oral argument has direct strategic implications:

• No live opportunity to repair pleading deficiencies. What is in the briefs is what the court will decide on. Plaintiffs counting on oral-argument hand-waving to soften deficiencies will be disappointed.
• No live opportunity to clarify a misread argument. If the moving brief mischaracterizes a position, the response brief is the only place to correct it.
• Briefs must stand on their own. Citations must be complete; key arguments must be foregrounded; subsidiary arguments cannot rely on oral elaboration.
• Reply brief is the last word. Once the reply is filed, the matter is taken under submission.

When CACD judges DO hold oral argument

Some CACD judges hold oral argument as a matter of course or in particular cases. In the corpus:

• Judge Almadani held oral argument on Russell v. Dave (461828447), an MLA-arbitration motion with statutory-interpretation issues.
• Judge Staton held oral argument on Little v. LA County Fire Department (467116036), a multi-doctrine abstention motion (Younger/Burford/Colorado River).

These tend to be matters with substantial doctrinal complexity, statutory-interpretation centerpiece, or multi-claim weight that benefits from live colloquy. The L.R. 7-15 default is not absolute.

If you're the moving party

• Treat the briefs as your only opportunity to win. Front-load the strongest argument; cite primary authority for every key point; anticipate counter-arguments in opening rather than reply.
• The reply brief is constrained by what was raised in opposition; do not save your strongest argument for reply.
• If you believe the case requires oral argument, request it explicitly with reasons. Do not assume it.

If you're the opposing party

• The opposition brief is your only opportunity to dispute the moving party's framing. Respond comprehensively; do not assume oral argument will allow clarification.
• Failure to address an argument in the opposition brief operates as concession or waiver. Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Financial Corp., 802 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011); Kerrigan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 543 F. Supp. 3d 843, 845-46 (C.D. Cal. 2021).
• Do not raise new theories in opposition. Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998). New facts must be in the operative complaint.
• If your case has substantial doctrinal complexity that genuinely benefits from oral argument, request it explicitly with reasons.

Cross-references

The L.R. 7-15 default works in tandem with the Schneider rule (no new allegations in opposition) and the Stichting/Kerrigan rule (failure-to-oppose-an-argument as concession). Together, these three rules establish that the briefs are dispositive: what is on the page is what the court decides on.